Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries

被引:106
|
作者
Hessami, Zohal [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Konstanz, Dept Econ, D-78457 Constance, Germany
关键词
Corruption; Rent seeking; Rent creation; Public procurement; Budget composition; RENT-SEEKING; GROWTH; SIZE; ECONOMY; DEFENSE; COSTS; TESTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the relation between political corruption and the composition of public spending. A rent-seeking model is used to describe political rent creation through the composition of public spending. Political corruption is indicated by empirical results for 29 OECD countries for the period 1996-2009: allocation of public spending to expenditure categories characterized by high-technology goods supplied by non-competitive industries varies positively with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International. Previous literature on corruption in government has focused on low-income countries. The results of this study suggest that political corruption is also an issue in OECD countries. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:372 / 389
页数:18
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