Incentive Contract in Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

被引：4
|
作者：
Su, Yingsheng [1 ]
Guo, Hongmei [2 ]
Wang, Xianyu [2 ]
机构：
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat, Chengdu 611130, Peoples R China
[2] Sichuan Univ, Sch Business, Chengdu 610064, Peoples R China
来源：
DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY | 2014年 / 2014卷
关键词：
COORDINATION; DEMAND;
D O I：
10.1155/2014/380142
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
The supply chain always appears inefficient because of the different targets of members and information asymmetry, especially when upstream enterprises not only hide information about their effort levels, but also hide information about their technology level. The paper uses principal-agent theory and the theory of regulation to design the contract to realize the maximization of principal's profit on the condition that the contract satisfies the participant and incentive conditions of agent. As a result, it is obvious that the contract achieves the goal of control. In addition, it also can be concluded that the amount of rent that the manufacturer can obtain is up to the value of his information and the condition of his resource.
引用
收藏
页数：6
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The Analysis of the Supply Chain Incentive Contract under Asymmetric Information
    Li Shanliang
    Wang Chunhua
    [J]. 2008 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, NETWORKING AND MOBILE COMPUTING, VOLS 1-31, 2008, : 6431 - +
  • [2] Incentive contract design for reducing carbon emissions in the supply chain under asymmetric information
    Zhou, Jianheng
    Wu, Bo
    [J]. MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 2024,
  • [3] Supply Chain Contract Management Based on Asymmetric Information
    Jia Weiying
    Liu Yongsheng
    [J]. 2010 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON E-BUSINESS AND INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY (EBISS 2010), 2010, : 481 - 484
  • [4] Perishable food supply chain contract with asymmetric freshness information
    Januardi, Januardi
    Lin, Shi-Woei
    Lee, Chiang-Sheng
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE-OPERATIONS & LOGISTICS, 2024, 11 (01)
  • [5] Price-adjusting contract in supply chain with asymmetric information
    Lu, SH
    [J]. 2005 International Conference on Services Systems and Services Management, Vols 1 and 2, Proceedings, 2005, : 684 - 686
  • [6] Study on Incentive Mechanism for Closed Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information
    Li, Hong
    Zhou, Jingui
    Ma, Lilin
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, SSMSSD10, VOL 2, 2011, : 127 - 132
  • [7] Optimal Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Cost Information
    Yao Min
    Wang Fang
    Chen Zhiyuan
    Ye Hanrui
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2020, 146 (06)
  • [8] Optimal Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Cost Information
    Yao, Min
    Wang, Fang
    Chen, Zhiyuan
    Ye, Hanrui
    [J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2020, 146 (06):
  • [9] Revenue Sharing Contract Design in Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information
    Weng Ming
    Xu Xu-song
    [J]. 2007 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, NETWORKING AND MOBILE COMPUTING, VOLS 1-15, 2007, : 4906 - 4909
  • [10] Research on the Loss Sharing Contract in Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information
    Jinling SUN
    Peiyu ZHU
    Shumo JIN
    Hongbin WANG
    [J]. Journal of Systems Science and Information, 2019, 7 (02) : 187 - 198
12345