Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation, Audit Quality, and Market Perception: Evidence from Taiwan

被引:160
|
作者
Chi, Wuchun [1 ]
Huang, Huichi [2 ]
Liao, Yichun [3 ]
Xie, Hong [4 ]
机构
[1] Natl Chengchi Univ, Taipei, Taiwan
[2] Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA
[3] Natl Taiwan Univ, Taipei, Taiwan
[4] Univ Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
关键词
Audit quality; Auditor tenure; Mandatory audit partner rotation; Perceptions of audit quality; ABNORMAL ACCRUALS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; NONAUDIT SERVICES; FIRM TENURE; PERFORMANCE; PRICES; INDEPENDENCE; ASSOCIATION; HYPOTHESIS; VALUATION;
D O I
10.1506/car.26.2.2
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the effectiveness of mandatory audit partner rotation in promoting audit quality and perceptions of audit quality using audit data from Taiwan, where a five-year audit partner rotation became de facto mandatory in 2004. We identify a sample of companies in 2004 whose audit partners were subject to mandatory rotation and compare this mandatory rotation sample with three benchmark samples: (a) companies in 2004 whose audit partners were not subject to mandatory rotation, (b) companies in the mandatory rotation sample one year earlier (2003) under old audit partners, and (c) companies in years before 2003 whose audit partners were voluntarily rotated. Using both absolute and signed abnormal accruals as proxies for audit quality, we find no evidence that mandatory audit partner rotation enhances audit quality. In addition, we use the earnings response coefficient as a proxy for investor perceptions of audit quality and find no consistent evidence that mandatory audit partner rotation enhances perceived audit quality. Taken together, our findings are inconsistent with the belief that mandatory audit partner rotation enhances audit quality or perceptions of audit quality.
引用
收藏
页码:359 / +
页数:34
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