The Farmers' Channel Selection and Sustainable Analysis under Carbon Tax Policy

被引:2
|
作者
Zheng, Cong [1 ]
Pang, Quangui [2 ]
Li, Tianpei [3 ]
Wang, Guizheng [1 ]
Cai, Yiji [1 ]
Yang, Lei [1 ]
机构
[1] South China Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Commerce, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] South China Univ Technol, Sch Elect Power, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] South China Univ Technol, Sch Design, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, Peoples R China
关键词
agricultural product; channel selection; carbon tax; sustainability; SUPPLY-CHAIN; EMISSION REDUCTION; INVENTORY; FOOTPRINT; DECISIONS; DETERIORATION; STRATEGIES; PRODUCTS; MODELS; CHOICE;
D O I
10.3390/su11102765
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This paper examines a farmer's channel selection in a supply chain led by a retailer, considering carbon emissions and products' deterioration. Three channelsonline channels, retail channels, and dual channelsare proposed. The inventory model of perishable products and the two-stage Stackelberg game model are used to illustrate the operational process. To compare performances of the three channel structures, we further determine the critical points consisting of the profits and the carbon emissions among these channels. The results provide useful insights for supply chain members and the government. Farmers can choose a channel to optimize profit with respect to deterioration rate and product yield, but it might conflict with the aim of least carbon emissions. When the deterioration rate is high, the online channel is not a suitable choice. For the government, the carbon tax contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions, but it also leads to the loss of the farmer's profit. Additionally, numerical results further illustrate that, from the perspective of the government, transporting and inventory processes are two major sources of emissions, and it is essential to implement carbon tax and exploit low-carbon transportation.
引用
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页数:24
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