Study on Incentive and Constraint Mechanism of Construction Project Based on Principal-agent Theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Yang Gao-sheng [1 ]
Li-jie [1 ]
机构：
[1] Hohai Univ, Sch Business, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, SSMSSD10, VOL 4 | 2011年
关键词：
principal-agent; construction project contract design; asymmetrical information;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In allusion to the owner and the contractor being inconsistent with objective function, the information being asymmetrical and the existence of corruption and collusion, the paper first analyzes the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the contractor and then establishes a mathematical model to design the optimal incentive and constraint contract under asymmetrical information based on the principal-agent theory in information economics, and finally puts forward some methods to establish the incentive and constraint mechanism for construction project so as to provide the theoretical guidance for the contract design of the project construction
引用
收藏
页码：277 / 282
页数：6
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