A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

被引:11
|
作者
Soares, Jorge [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Delaware, Dept Econ, Newark, DE 19716 USA
关键词
public education; voting; general equilibrium;
D O I
10.1007/s00148-005-0034-y
中图分类号
C921 [人口统计学];
学科分类号
摘要
The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits, and its impact on factor prices. I then focus on the impact of implementing a social security system on the equilibrium levels of education funding and on welfare. I find that although in the benchmark economy, the presence of social security might generate support for public funding of education, its overall effect on the well-being of individuals is negative for any level of social security taxation.
引用
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页码:367 / 389
页数:23
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