Regional subsidies and interregional labor movement

被引:0
|
作者
Matsuzaki, Daisuke [1 ]
Ono, Yoshiyasu [2 ]
机构
[1] Toyo Univ, Fac Econ, Bunkyo Ku, 5-20-28 Hakusan, Tokyo 1128606, Japan
[2] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 5670047, Japan
来源
ANNALS OF REGIONAL SCIENCE | 2021年 / 66卷 / 03期
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
H71; R23; R51; HARRIS-TODARO MODEL; URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT; CAPITAL MOBILITY; EFFICIENCY; WELFARE; MIGRATION; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1007/s00168-020-01029-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Japan distributes lump-sum grants and subsidies to the vast majority of local regions. Each region makes a decision regarding expenditure and can choose between non-distortionary direct transfers to the region's natives and subsidies to stimulate the local economy. Considering a two-region economy with interregional labor migration, we compare the welfare effects of direct transfers and economic stimulation subsidies including those intended to support production, employment, wages, and residents. The results show that under full employment, replacing direct transfers with stimulation subsidies benefits (harms) natives if the recipient region specializes in labor-intensive (labor-saving) activities. However, such replacements can be detrimental to natives if the region suffers unemployment due to wage rigidity. For example, wage and resident subsidies may cause harm as they promote immigration, without stimulating production.
引用
收藏
页码:557 / 577
页数:21
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