Relativism of Truth vs. Dogmatism about Truths A False Dichotomy

被引:0
|
作者
Jose Frapolli, Maria [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Granada, Dept Filosofia 1, E-18011 Granada, Spain
来源
TEOREMA | 2009年 / 28卷 / 03期
关键词
Truth; Haack; Blackburn; Rorty; Pragmatism; Pro-Sentence;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
A correct understanding of the functioning of truth ascriptions, in the context of the contemporary philosophy of language, permits the assumption of different pragmatist approaches to truth that seem, at first glance, incompatible. In particular, some theses defended by Haack can be maintained together with some claims made by Rorty. Using a pragmatic background that respects the Pragmatist Maxim, the paper attempts to dispel part of the confusion that surrounds the notion of truth.
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页码:65 / 79
页数:15
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