PARTIES, POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT

被引：27

作者：

Innes, Robert ^{[1
]}

Mitra, Arnab ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] UC Merced, Sch Social Sci Humanities & Arts, Dept Econ, Merced, CA 95343 USA

[2] Portland State Univ, Dept Econ, Portland, OR 97201 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2015年 / 53卷 / 01期

关键词：

US-HOUSE; ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION; POLLUTION; POLICY; ELECTIONS; MATTER; INDUSTRY;

D O I：

10.1111/ecin.12142

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility-level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989-2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)

引用

页码：522 / 539

页数：18

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