Strategic delegation in experimental markets

被引：20
|
作者：
Huck, S
Müller, W
Normann, HT
机构：
[1] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England
[2] UCL, Ctr Econ Learning & Social Evolut, London WC1E 6BT, England
[3] Tilburg Univ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[4] Royal Holloway Univ London, London, England
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2004年 / 22卷 / 04期
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
experimental economics; oligopoly; inequality aversion; managerial incentives; strategic delegation;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.10.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts, which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：561 / 574
页数：14
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