Can earnings fixated investors survive in a competitive securities market? Implications for sustained price anomalies and mark-to market accounting

We model the dynamic survival of earnings fixated investors in a competitive securities market that allows for learning and arbitrage and that is populated by heterogeneous investors. Our model is distinct from those based on aggressive trading by overconfident investors. We prove that in the absence of noise traders, rational investors will drive out earnings fixated investors from the market in the long-run. More interestingly, we show that in a market with noise traders, some proportion of earnings fixated investors survive in long-run equilibrium for all feasible model parameter values. Furthermore, under no circumstances can the earnings fixated investors be driven out of the market completely. On the contrary, for some parameter values, the earnings fixated investors drive out the rational investors entirely. These results rationalize the long-run sustainability of common pricing anomalies. They also highlight potential benefits to society of mark-to-market accounting.