Mens rea, motive and assisted suicide: does the DPP's Policy go too far?

The issue of decriminalising euthanasia and/or assisted suicide has been the subject of a number of high-profile cases, the most recent of which was the Court of Appeal decision in R (Nicklinson & Lamb) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961. This paper will focus on the offence of assisted suicide and Martin's argument that the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, issued by the DPP following the House of Lords' final judgment in R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45 failed to provide foreseeability where a prospective assister was not someone with an emotional connection to the requester. The success of this claim offers a fresh opportunity to examine a somewhat neglected aspect of the Policy that emanated from the Purdy case, namely its potential challenge to the oft-stated claim that motive is irrelevant to mens rea. It is my contention that the Policy has (effectively) amended s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 by making compassion/motive a definitional element of the offence, and that this is problematic because it contravenes a limitation imposed by the maxim that supports the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.