A Nash tax game extending the generality of the Henry George Theorem

被引：4
|
作者：
Kunce, M [1 ]
机构：
[1] Dept Econ & Finance, Laramie, WY 82071 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2000年 / 66卷 / 02期
关键词：
tax competition; efficiency; optimal taxation;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00212-8
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper analyzes a model of Nash tax competition when jurisdictions can finance public goods with taxes on two types of mobile capital and a tax on land. Efficiency in public good provision results when the land tax becomes the single tax required to fund local government spending. This conclusion affirms and extends the generality of the Henry George Theorem. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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页码：229 / 233
页数：5
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