Integer Programming Based Stable and Efficiency Algorithm for Two-sided Matching with Indifferences

被引:0
|
作者
Ohta, Naoki [1 ]
机构
[1] Ritsumeikan Univ, Coll Informat Sci & Engn, Kusatsu, Shiga 5258577, Japan
关键词
Multi-agent system; Two-sided matching; Integer programming; MARRIAGE;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-319-24069-5_44
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
To make use of collective intelligence of many autonomous self-interested agents, it is important to form a team that all the agents agree. Two-sided matching is one of the basic approaches to form a team that consists of agents from two disjoint agent groups. Traditional two-sided matching assumes that an agent has totally ordered preference list of agents to be paired with. However, it is unrealistic to have a totally ordered list for a large-scale two-sided matching problem. Therefore, two-sided matching with indifferences is proposed. It allows indifferences in the preference list of agents. Two-sided matching with indifferences has two important characters weakly stable and Pareto efficiency. In this paper, we propose a new integer programming based algorithm "nucleolus" for two-sided matching with indifferences. This algorithm propose the matching which satisfies weakly stable and Pareto efficiency.
引用
收藏
页码:463 / 472
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] An Integer Programming Approach for Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences
    Ohta, Naoki
    Kuwabara, Kazuhiro
    [J]. COMPUTATIONAL COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS, ICCCI 2014, 2014, 8733 : 563 - 572
  • [2] Two-sided matching with indifferences
    Erdil, Aytek
    Ergin, Haluk
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2017, 171 : 268 - 292
  • [3] Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences: Using Heuristics to Improve Properties of Stable Matchings
    Christian Haas
    [J]. Computational Economics, 2021, 57 : 1115 - 1148
  • [4] Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences: Using Heuristics to Improve Properties of Stable Matchings
    Haas, Christian
    [J]. COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2021, 57 (04) : 1115 - 1148
  • [5] Equivalence of two-sided stable matching
    Liwei Zhong
    Yanqin Bai
    [J]. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018, 36 : 1380 - 1387
  • [6] Equivalence of two-sided stable matching
    Zhong, Liwei
    Bai, Yanqin
    [J]. JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION, 2018, 36 (04) : 1380 - 1387
  • [7] Stable two-sided satisfied matching for ridesharing system based on preference orders
    Rong Zhao
    Maozhu Jin
    Peiyu Ren
    Qian Zhang
    [J]. The Journal of Supercomputing, 2020, 76 : 1063 - 1081
  • [8] Stable Two-Sided Satisfied Matching for Hospitals and Patients Based on the Disappointment Theory
    Wang, Xiaojia
    Wang, Rong
    Zhang, Shanshan
    Liu, Junhang
    Jiang, Li
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS, 2022, 15 (01)
  • [9] Stable two-sided satisfied matching for ridesharing system based on preference orders
    Zhao, Rong
    Jin, Maozhu
    Ren, Peiyu
    Zhang, Qian
    [J]. JOURNAL OF SUPERCOMPUTING, 2020, 76 (02): : 1063 - 1081
  • [10] Stable Two-Sided Satisfied Matching for Hospitals and Patients Based on the Disappointment Theory
    Xiaojia Wang
    Rong Wang
    Shanshan Zhang
    Junhang Liu
    Li Jiang
    [J]. International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, 15