Veto players: How political institutions work.

被引：1

|

作者：

Steunenberg, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Leiden Univ, NL-2300 RA Leiden, Netherlands

来源：

WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS | 2004年 / 27卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/0140238042000228130

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：535 / 536

页数：2

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