Earnings credibility in politically connected family firms

被引:17
|
作者
Bona-Sanchez, Carolina [1 ]
Perez-Aleman, Jeronimo [1 ]
Javier Santana-Martin, Domingo [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Las Palmas Gran Canaria, Las Palmas Gran Canaria, Spain
来源
BRITISH ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2019年 / 51卷 / 03期
关键词
Family control; Political ties; Earnings informativeness; Signalling theory; Bonding mechanisms; CASH FLOW RIGHTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; ASIAN CRISIS; PERFORMANCE; QUALITY; INFORMATIVENESS; MANAGEMENT; CONSERVATISM;
D O I
10.1016/j.bar.2018.12.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate whether politically connected family firms provide the market with more or less credible earnings compared with unconnected family firms. Our results evidence that politically connected family firms show higher earnings informativeness than unconnected family firms. Our findings are consistent with the market perceiving that, in the presence of political ties, family firms are more likely to reduce information asymmetries by signalling their superior earnings quality.
引用
收藏
页码:316 / 332
页数:17
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