Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis

被引:2
|
作者
Archer, Avery [1 ]
机构
[1] George Washington Univ, Washington, DC 20052 USA
来源
关键词
cognitivism; intending to try; means-ends coherence; intention; practical reason;
D O I
10.1111/theo.12144
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X. John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X. Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT - namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try - comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT from playing the kind of explanatory role the cognitivist requires. This article meets Brunero's challenge to SBT by offering an account of trying and intending to try that not only saves SBT from Brunero's criticism, but does so in a way that preserves the explanatory significance that cognitivists typically take SBT to have.
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页码:140 / 156
页数:17
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