Profit sharing as a worker discipline device

被引:4
|
作者
Lin, CC
Chang, JJ [1 ]
Lai, CC
机构
[1] Fu Jen Catholic Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei 242, Taiwan
[2] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[3] Acad Sinica, Sun Yat Sen Inst Social Sci & Philosophy, Taipei 115, Taiwan
关键词
efficiency wages; profit sharing; involuntary unemployment;
D O I
10.1016/S0264-9993(01)00081-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A synthesis of profit-sharing and efficiency wage models is constructed to provide a preliminary account of how a firm determines its pay parameters, and why it chooses to be a profit-sharing or a fixed-wage firm. We find that the properties of the worker's effort function crucially influence the firm's choices between different compensation systems, and that the adoption of a profit-sharing scheme cannot guarantee the attainment of full employment. Other findings of the paper also seem to be very different from those of Weitzman's share model. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:815 / 828
页数:14
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