Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen

被引:6
|
作者
Kelp, Christoph [1 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Ctr Log & Analyt Philosophy, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
KNOWLEDGE; GRECO; KELP;
D O I
10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515-529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963-970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245-252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen's (Erkenntnis 78:963-970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
引用
收藏
页码:729 / 732
页数:4
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