A critique of Schopenhauer's metaphysic

Schopenhauer's metaphysic is not more credible than the systems of his contemporaries Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, all of whom he criticised so severely. But as his writings, unlike theirs, are so lucid, they illustrate very clearly the metaphysician's endeavour to reach knowledge that is immediate and indubitable, not mediated by the sense organs and the brain, as is knowledge of the external world. He argues that 'das Einzige wirklich und unbedingt Gegebene ist das SelbstbewuBtsein', which alone can yield 'die letzten und wichtigsten Atifscblilsse uber das Wesen der Dinge'. He himself was not religious, but this doctrine has appealed to theologians seeking a basis for their belief that is independent of external (historical) testimony. In this connection, Albert Schweitzer expressly urged a return to the German metaphysical tradition, in particular to Schopenhauer's view of the will as the transcendent reality at the basis of self-consciousness. The present article argues, in the British empirical tradition, that there is really no reason to distinguish self-consciousness and experiences attributable to will from other kinds of experience. The practical distinction is that the idea of self depends largely not on the sensations provided by readily observable senses such as sight and hearing, but on muscular, articular and visceral receptors which constitute a less accessible internal sensorium.