Large Shareholding and Firm Value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

被引：2
|
作者：
Mortazian, Mona [1 ]
Tabaghdehi, Seyedeh Asieh H. [2 ]
Mase, Bryan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Brunel Univ London, Kingstone Lane, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, Middx, England
[2] Regents Univ London, Regents Pk, London NW1 4NS, England
来源：
ASIA-PACIFIC FINANCIAL MARKETS | 2019年 / 26卷 / 02期
关键词：
Corporate governance; Alternative Investment Market (AIM); Managerial blockholders; Firm value; Tobin's Q; Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; VOTING-RIGHTS; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; AGENCY COSTS; BLOCKHOLDERS; PERFORMANCE; PROTECTION; MANAGEMENT; VALUATION;
D O I：
10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.
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页码：229 / 252
页数：24
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