Managerial diversion, product market competition, and firm performance

被引：2
|
作者：
Li, Guangzhong [1 ]
Li, Jie [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Business Sch, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Jinan Univ, Inst Ind Econ, 601 West Huangpudadao Ave, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] Jinan Univ, Inst Ind Org & Regulat, 601 West Huangpudadao Ave, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China
来源：
CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2018年 / 50卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Executive compensation; Managerial diversion; Product market behavior; State-owned enterprises; China; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY COSTS; BEHAVIOR; FINANCE; PERKS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.chieco.2018.04.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We derive the conditions under which a manager will divert and how managerial diversion affects product market performance and firm profits. Our model predicts that managerial diversion is more likely to occur and leads to more aggressive product market behavior in a firm with weak incentives and corporate governance. In these firms, the relation between managerial diversion and firm profits is inverse U-shaped. Chinese state-owned manufacturing firms are used to test our theoretical model, and we find supportive evidence.
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页码：240 / 264
页数：25
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