Protectionist Non-Compliance in the Single Market of the European Union

被引:0
|
作者
Guimaraes, Maria Helena [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minho, Braga, Portugal
来源
DADOS-REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIAIS | 2018年 / 61卷 / 01期
关键词
European Union; single market; infractions; protectionism; groups of economic interest; TRADE LIBERALIZATION; MEMBER STATES; INTEGRATION; BARRIERS; COUNTRIES; TARIFF;
D O I
10.1590/001152582018146
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Although the single market of the European Union (EU) supposes the inexistence of barriers in intracommunity trade, such barriers persist, hindering the free circulation of goods between the member states. The main argument proposed in this article is that governments of EU countries tend to accept infringements on freedom of circulation and to maintain the protectionist status quo in sectors in which groups of economic interest are most influential. Based on a statistical analysis of two databases made available by the European Commission, the article highlights the prevalence of such protectionist infractions in the EU, with a particular analysis made on how national protection is more frequent in sectors with a greater capacity for pressure, namely in the agricultural sector. The European experience is a useful comparison point for other integration projects in so far as it reveals how protectionist pressures from economic groups can lead to persistent violations of the regulations in agreements, demonstrating the need for continuous efforts by regional institutions to oppose such non-compliance.
引用
收藏
页码:47 / 76
页数:30
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