The logic of universalization guides moral judgment

被引:28
|
作者
Levine, Sydney [1 ,2 ]
Kleiman-Weiner, Max [1 ,2 ]
Schulz, Laura [2 ]
Tenenbaum, Joshua [2 ]
Cushman, Fiery [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, 33 Kirkland St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] MIT, Dept Brain & Cognit Sci, E25-618, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
moral judgment; moral development; universalization; GROUP SELECTION; INFERENCE; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.2014505117
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
To explain why an action is wrong, we sometimes say, "What if everybody did that?" In other words, even if a single person's behavior is harmless, that behavior may be wrong if it would be harmful once universalized. We formalize the process of universalization in a computational model, test its quantitative predictions in studies of human moral judgment, and distinguish it from alternative models. We show that adults spontaneously make moral judgments consistent with the logic of universalization, and report comparable patterns of judgment in children. We conclude that, alongside other well-characterized mechanisms of moral judgment, such as outcome-based and rule-based thinking, the logic of universalizing holds an important place in our moral minds.
引用
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页码:26158 / 26169
页数:12
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