The Research of Tripartite Game Between Managers and Executors in Logistics Security Under the Influence of Government

被引:0
|
作者
Guo, Zhen [1 ]
Lin, Yun [1 ]
Huang, Xingjun [1 ]
Li, Jie [2 ]
Yang, Wenwen [1 ]
机构
[1] Chongqing Univ, Coll Mech Engn, Chongqing, Peoples R China
[2] Chongqing Univ, Sch Automot Engn, Chongqing, Peoples R China
关键词
Logistics security; Tripartite game model; Evolutionary game theory; Stability of game; Numerical simulation;
D O I
10.1007/978-981-13-2396-6_13
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Based on logistics security, this paper analysis that people as one of the most important roles affect logistics security, and the games among different hierarchies will lead to different results of logistics security. By constructing a tripartite game model of participating groups, including government, managers and executors, in logistics security, the income matrix of tripartite game can be listed, and then we can find the game equilibrium points through evolutionary game theory. Through using the game model simulation by placing the value which makes the characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix less than zero, we can get expected game equilibrium point which is {supervising, strengthening, executing}. Meanwhile changing some of the initial values under the government's macro-regulatory effect, such as increasing the cost of punishment and rewards for managers and executors or reducing the input cost and the opportunity cost of doing other inputs appropriately and so on, can promote the three participants to build a stable and safe logistics transportation environment.
引用
收藏
页码:146 / 156
页数:11
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