From reliabilism to virtue epistemology

被引：0
|
作者：
Zagzebski, L [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Oklahoma, Kingfisher Coll Chair Philosophy Relig & Eth, Norman, OK 73019 USA
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL 5: EPISTEMOLOGY | 2000年
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
In Virtues of the Mind I object to process reliabilism on the grounds that it does not explain the good of knowledge in addition to the good of true belief. In this paper I wish to develop this objection in more detail, and will then argue that this problem pushes us first in the direction of two offspring of process reliabilism-faculty reliabilism and proper functionalism, and, finally, to a true virtue epistemology.
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页码：173 / 179
页数：7
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