Committees;
Voting models;
Supermajority;
Political economy of central banking;
FEDERAL-RESERVE;
COMMITTEES;
PREFERENCES;
REPUTATION;
EXPERTS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.