Dissent in monetary policy decisions

被引:18
|
作者
Riboni, Alessandro [1 ]
Ruge-Murcia, Francisco [2 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Polytech, Dept Econ, F-91128 Palaiseau, France
[2] McGill Univ, Dept Econ, 855 Sherbrooke St West, Montreal, PQ H3A 2T7, Canada
关键词
Committees; Voting models; Supermajority; Political economy of central banking; FEDERAL-RESERVE; COMMITTEES; PREFERENCES; REPUTATION; EXPERTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:137 / 154
页数:18
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