Partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector: Theory and evidence from Norway

被引:36
|
作者
Borge, Lars-Erik [1 ]
Brueckner, Jan K. [2 ]
Rattso, Jorn [1 ]
机构
[1] Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Econ, N-7491 Trondheim, Norway
[2] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
关键词
Fiscal decentralization; Tiebout; Norway; TIEBOUT HYPOTHESIS; GOVERNMENT; CENTRALIZATION; EXPENDITURES; FEDERALISM; ALLOCATION; COSTS; GOODS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jue.2014.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper provides an empirical test of a principal tenet of fiscal federalism: that spending discretion, when granted to localities, allows public-good levels to adjust to suit local demands. The test is based on a simple model of partial fiscal decentralization, under which earmarking of central transfers for particular uses is eliminated, allowing funds to be spent according to local tastes. The greater role of local demand determinants following partial decentralization is confirmed by the paper's empirical results, which show the effects of the 1986 Norwegian reform. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:153 / 163
页数:11
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