Low-powered vs high-powered incentives: Evidence from German electricity networks

被引：10
|
作者：
Hellwig, Michael [1 ,2 ]
Schober, Dominik [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Cabral, Luis [6 ,7 ]
机构：
[1] ZEW Ctr European Econ Res, Mannheim, Germany
[2] MaCCI Mannheim Ctr Competit & Innovat, Mannheim, Germany
[3] Univ Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
[4] MaCCI, Mannheim, Germany
[5] MISES, Mannheim, Germany
[6] NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10003 USA
[7] CEPR, London, England
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2020年 / 73卷 / 73期
关键词：
Regulation; Ratchet effect; Electricity utilities; Difference-in-differences; Efficiency analysis; PRICE-CAP REGULATION; RATE-OF-RETURN; IN-DIFFERENCES; EFFICIENCY; INFRASTRUCTURE; PRIVATISATION; COMPETITION; MARKETS; IMPACT; COSTS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102587
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We propose a difference-in-differences approach to estimating the impact of incentives on cost reduction in the context of German electricity networks. When subject to a lower powered regulation mechanism, relatively more efficient operators pile up more costs in the year used to determine future prices. This pattern is consistent with the idea that incentives matter: higher-powered incentives lead to cost reduction. The results are also consistent with an equilibrium where more efficient firms pool with less efficient ones under the threat of ratcheting. (c) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：30
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