Selective Information Disclosure in Contests

被引：0
|
作者：
Levy, Priel [1 ]
Sarne, David [1 ]
Aumann, Yonatan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Bar Ilan Univ, Ramat Gan, Israel
来源：
AAMAS '19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS | 2019年
基金：
以色列科学基金会;
关键词：
DESIGN; INCENTIVES; PRIZES;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号：
081202 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：2093 / 2095
页数：3
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