Energy tax and competition in energy efficiency: The case of consumer durables

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of an energy tax on technical improvements and on prices of consumer durables induced by strategic competition in energy efficiency. If the gasoline tax is raised this does in principle not affect the producers of cars because the motorist pays for it in terms of a higher cost of using the car. This, however, affects the unit sales of car producers because of substitution towards other modes of transportation. A second element of reaction to energy price variation is an indirect one and relates to the effect of energy prices on technology. Competition forces car producers to develop more energy efficient cars in order to reduce the cost of using a car. This indirect effect can partly offset the direct effect of higher energy prices on demand if it is profitable for the automobile industry to engineer more energy efficient equipment. We will analyze the impact of an energy tax on energy efficiency and on the price of a durable good. This will be done within the framework of a duopoly competing in prices and in the energy efficiency of its products. The government chooses a welfare maximizing energy tax as an incentive to innovate. Then we will analyze a strategic two-stage decision process in which the duopolists first decide about energy efficiency and then compete in prices.