Earnings performance measures and CEO turnover: Street versus GAAP earnings

被引:10
|
作者
Jarva, Henry [1 ]
Kallunki, Juha-Pekka [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Livne, Gilad [4 ]
机构
[1] Aalto Univ, Espoo, Finland
[2] Univ Oulu, Oulu, Finland
[3] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden
[4] Univ Exeter, Exeter, Devon, England
关键词
Street earnings; Street exclusions; GAAP earnings; CEO turnover; PRO FORMA EARNINGS; RELATIVE INFORMATIVENESS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STOCK-PRICES; MANAGERS; ANALYSTS; COMPENSATION; DISCLOSURES; PERMANENCE; SUCCESSION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.02.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Prior research reports that analysts focus on street earnings, which are measures that typically exceed GAAP earnings. Using a sample of CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2016 we show that the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are higher when analysts exclude income-decreasing items. The association between exclusions and forced turnovers is particularly pronounced for high magnitude exclusions. We also show that greater street exclusion of income-decreasing items, the lower CEO bonus payouts. We find that boards use audited and more conservative GAAP earnings in evaluating and dismissing CEOs, except in the recent period of 2010-2016.
引用
收藏
页码:249 / 266
页数:18
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