Some Commentaries on the two Editions of the Critique of Pure Reason and its Reception on Husserl's Phenomenology

In this article I propose to show some aspects of Kant's philosophy that may have served as an antecedent to the elaboration of phenomenology by Husserl. In this respect the Deduction of the pure concepts of understanding is taken as a systematization of Kant's criticism, but furthermore, because of the controversy aroused by the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason surrounding imagination in this section. Once this part of the Critique is exposed in its generality, we'll be able to comprehend the insufficiencies Husserl has noted in it in relation to his own phenomenological project, especially in what concerns to eidetic analysis, which is missing in Kant's thought. Husserl will pick up certain aspects, specifically the one about synthesis, which will show itself as the broader concept of constitution understood from Ideas I.