Why Do Experts Disagree?

被引:5
|
作者
Reiss, Julian [1 ]
机构
[1] JKU Linz, Inst Philosophy & Sci Method, Altenberger Str 50, A-4040 Linz, Austria
关键词
epistocracy; expert disagreement; technocracy; value pluralism; spiral of conviction;
D O I
10.1080/08913811.2020.1872948
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Jeffrey Friedman's Power Without Knowledge argues forcefully that there are inherent limitations to the predictability of human action, due to a circumstance he calls "ideational heterogeneity." However, our resources for predicting human action somewhat reliably in the light of ideational heterogeneity have not been exhausted yet, and there are no in-principle barriers to progress in tackling the problem. There are, however, other strong reasons to think that disagreement among epistocrats is bound to persist, such that it will be difficult to decide who has "the right answer" to a given technocratic problem. These reasons have to do with competing visions of the good society, fact/value entanglement, and the fragility of the facts of the social sciences.
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页码:218 / 241
页数:24
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