Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

被引:35
|
作者
Ohseto, Shinji [1 ]
机构
[1] Tohoku Univ, Fac Econ, Sendai, Miyagi 9808576, Japan
关键词
indivisible goods; strategy-proofness; envy-freeness; Groves mechanisms;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.
引用
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页码:111 / 121
页数:11
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