Voting power indicators in the European Union

被引：1
|
作者：
Louzek, M
机构：
[1] Ctr Econ & Polit, CZ-11000 Prague 1, Czech Republic
[2] Univ Econ, CZ-13067 Prague, Czech Republic
来源：
POLITICKA EKONOMIE | 2004年 / 52卷 / 03期
关键词：
voting indicator; EU enlargement; index of power; minimal winning coalitions; game theory; quantitative analysis;
D O I：
10.18267/j.polek.461
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The article is concerned with voting indicators in the European Union. The first chapter constructs a model of voting power and defines four indicators: A. Simple relative power, B. Shapley-Shubik index, C. Banzhaf index, D. Coleman index. The second chapter defines data: the voting structure according the Nice Treaty and nine algorithms - variants of the EU enlargement. The third chapter summarizes empirical results. The fourth chapter discusses statistical relations between voting indicators. The fifth chapter brings conclusions.
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页码：291 / 312
页数：22
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