China's experiment of emission permits trading

被引:5
|
作者
Guo, Hanyuan [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Syracuse Univ, Maxwell Sch Citizenship & Publ Affairs, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA
[2] 107 Robert Dr, Syracuse, NY 13210 USA
关键词
Emission permits; Emission permits trading; Efficiency; Competitive market; China; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.envdev.2018.02.001
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This paper identifies the main issues and weaknesses of China's current policy design and practice regarding emission permits trading. China's experiment establishing an emission trading market has advanced progressively for over 10 years covering more than 24 regions. By analyzing the latest official set of trading guidelines issued by the State Council in 2014 and its supplementary laws and regulations, this paper argues that the emission permits trading policy in China is a hybrid framework consisting of multiple policy instruments, each of which is intended to achieve efficiency. However, underlying conflicts among these instruments impair the overall efficiency of the policy and cause a waste of resources, and other problematic designs in this policy framework reduce the necessity and feasibility of emission trading. This paper further examines the emission trading practices in one typical pilot province and provides evidence and explanations of a non-competitive local trading market. In order to make the best use of the power of the market to reduce emissions in China, this paper argues that those issues in policy design should be addressed in the future.
引用
收藏
页码:112 / 122
页数:11
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