Since Aristotle the traditional definition of individuation has been considered on the basis of ousiological difference, i.e. in the sense of a categorization of the appearing in terms of language and judgment. In contrast, classical phenomenology has conceived the process of individuation with reference to the inner-temporal localization within the field of consciousness (or to Dasein). Thereby the pure difference of appearing/appearances turns out to be the transcendental fact of individuation. But even in this phenomenological perspective the original relationship to absolute Life, taking place unmortgaged by Being, remains unthought. If, consequently, we take into account this radical reciprocity of absolute Life and the individual as the primal-individuation in the sense of an exclusively "affective difference", a deeply-rooted affinity to the christological account on incarnation becomes visible. This reciprocity's facticity, which itself has not been created by philosophy, is taken for granted in every philosophical determination or position. Consequently, we have to understand that every philosophical performance in the sense of an ever individuated self-performance originates from this christologically founded individuation.
