Aquinas and continental philosophy of religion: Finding a way out of ontotheology

In this paper I consider how Aquinas has been interpreted by continental philosophers of religion and particularly in relation to the problem of ontotheology. A patient examination of the texts of those who have dealt with Aquinas reveals two basic problems. First, there is an underestimation of the radicality of Aquinas's negative theology. Second, no account is taken of the way Aquinas understands the relationship between reason and revelation. Aquinas's position on this relationship is even more crucial for the overcoming of onto-theology than is his negative theology. From a Christian perspective, what is at stake in overcoming onto-theology is the issue of keeping philosophical theology from overstepping its bounds and intruding on the domain of revelation. Revelation is the final standard when it comes to God-talk. If negative theology is to be done properly, it must be integrated into a theological position like Aquinas's that, while granting reason and revelation each their legitimate "autonomy," gives priority to the latter in questions of theology.