Existential foundations of social responsibility

Issues of vicarious, collective and other types of responsibility become more urgent under the growing global interconnectedness and interdependence. Since most actors are collective ones, we need a theoretical study of the grounds for social responsibility and its essential features as represented in diverse manifestations. The article considers social responsibility in terms of the existential-phenomenological approach developed by M.M. Bakhtin, J.-P. Sartre, M.K. Mamardashvili, H. Arendt, H. Blumer, etc. Social responsibility is a type of responsibility; therefore, the author searches for the most fundamental grounds of this phenomenon. This search allows to reveal the paradox of responsibility and to highlight the spatial-temporal boundariness as its most important structure that provides co-being (joint existence) with others. Everyone interplays the 'inner sociality' when interpreting acts (deeds) are always performed in front of the Other (including I as the Other for oneself). Thus, the Other plays the key role in making responsible choices. In the existential perspective, individual responsibility serves as a necessary basis for all other forms of responsibility including vicarious, collective and social. The author presents examples of different life situations to explain the choice of such criteria as the internal unity of the group focused on the 'common purpose' shared by all participants, and the strive for completeness for the sake of the Other without infringing the being of 'external' others.