CAN PLURALISM ACCOUNT FOR THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH?

被引：0
|
作者：
Edwards, Douglas [1 ]
机构：
[1] Utica Coll, Utica, NY 13502 USA
来源：
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2020年 / 57卷 / 04期
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D O I：
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中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
In this paper I assess whether truth pluralism can account for the normativity of truth. This is a key issue, as accommodating the idea that truth is normative is often presented as a main advantage that truth pluralism has over deflationism. The basis of the discussion is Engel's (2013) critique of truth pluralism, which questions the view's ability to account for the normativity of truth. l develop the ways truth pluralists of different sorts can respond to Engel's critique, and explore the accounts of the normativity of truth that emerge.
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页码：403 / 414
页数：12
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