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Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions
被引:0
|
作者
:
Brewster, Rachel
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Duke Law Sch, Durham, NC 27708 USA
Duke Ctr Int & Comparat Law, Durham, NC USA
Duke Law Sch, Durham, NC 27708 USA
Brewster, Rachel
[
1
,
2
]
机构
:
[1]
Duke Law Sch, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2]
Duke Ctr Int & Comparat Law, Durham, NC USA
来源
:
HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
|
2013年
/ 54卷
/ 02期
关键词
:
CREATE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS;
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT;
PROFESSORS POSNER;
EUROPEAN COURT;
HUMAN-RIGHTS;
LAW;
ENFORCEMENT;
CONTRACT;
DESIGN;
STATES;
D O I
:
暂无
中图分类号
:
D9 [法律];
DF [法律];
学科分类号
:
0301 ;
摘要
:
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 314
页数:56
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