We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed and are likely to have a longer duration in situations in which the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.
机构:
Louisiana State Univ, EJ Ourso Coll Business, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
Wharton Financial Inst Ctr, Philadelphia, PA USALouisiana State Univ, EJ Ourso Coll Business, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
Song, Wei-Ling
Wan, Kam-Ming
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaLouisiana State Univ, EJ Ourso Coll Business, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
机构:
Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Financial Studies IFS, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R ChinaSouthwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Financial Studies IFS, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
Liu, Chunbo
Shi, Wei
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Deakin Univ, Deakin Business Sch, Dept Accounting, Geelong, Vic, AustraliaSouthwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Financial Studies IFS, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
Shi, Wei
Wei, K. C. John
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaSouthwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Financial Studies IFS, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China