Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements

被引:116
|
作者
Gillan, Stuart L. [1 ]
Hartzell, Jay C. [2 ]
Parrino, Robert [2 ]
机构
[1] Texas Tech Univ, Rawls Coll, Business Adm, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2009年 / 64卷 / 04期
关键词
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL POWER; PERFORMANCE; TURNOVER; COST; PAY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01475.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed and are likely to have a longer duration in situations in which the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.
引用
收藏
页码:1629 / 1655
页数:27
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