Incentive effect of product structure on supply chain under asymmetric information.

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhang Cui-hua [1 ]
Huang Xiao-yuan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Northeastern Univ, Sch Business & Management, Shenyang 110004, Peoples R China
来源：
Proceedings of 2005 Chinese Control and Decision Conference, Vols 1 and 2 | 2005年
关键词：
product structure; asymmetric information; principal agent; supply chain; maximal principle;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
Incentive effect of product structure on supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Based on existent references, separable and nonseparable product structures are divided and principal agent models for them are set up. In the models, product investment level is supplier decision variable, quality evaluation and transfer payment are buyer decision variables. Maximal principle is used to get the solution to quality evaluation when supplier product investment level information is hidden. Results under different product structures are compared. Incentive effect of product structure on supply chain under asymmetric information is analyzed. At last simulation calculation is done.
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页码：1608 / 1612
页数：5
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