Scepticism about Scepticism

I argue that once we prioritize epistemic dependence and cast scepticism in those terms, rather than in modal terms, it is clear that skeptical arguments are no good. Skeptical arguments necessarily make dogmatic assumptions about what makes for knowledge or justification, or about what makes for lack of knowledge or justification. A dogmatist asserts an epistemic dependence relation at some level or other that something makes for knowledge or justification. But the skeptical assertion that something makes for the lack of knowledge or the lack of justification is then asserted dogmatically by the skeptic, and asserting that is as dogmatic as a non-skeptical assertion. Even if it is then said that both positive and negative epistemic views are not justified then we have a negative meta-epistemic dogmatic assertion. Wherever we draw the line, epistemic making relations are assumed. Both skeptical assertions and skeptical arguments assume such dependence claims. Dogmatism is our fate.