HOW COSTLY IS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION? GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING AND CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 209

被引:39
|
作者
Marion, Justin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Dept Econ, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
关键词
PREFERENTIAL PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS; SET-ASIDES; IMPACT; BUSINESS; DISCRIMINATION; EMPLOYMENT; AUCTIONS; MARKET;
D O I
10.1162/rest.91.3.503
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using California's Proposition 209, which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state-funded contracts. After Proposition 209, prices on state-funded contracts fell by 5.6% relative to federally funded projects, for which preferences still applied. Most of the price decline after Proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed, which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high-minority areas. Finally, short-run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action.
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页码:503 / 522
页数:20
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