Senate Influence or Presidential Unilateralism? An Examination of Treaties and Executive Agreements from Theodore Roosevelt and George W. Bush

被引:7
|
作者
Prins, Brandon C. [1 ]
Marshall, Bryan W. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
[2] Miami Univ, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
关键词
executive agreements; executive-legislative relations; international commitments; unilateral presidential power; US treaty process; POLICY;
D O I
10.1177/0738894208101129
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Treaty-making involves the constitutional struggle for policy control. Both the Executive and Senate are defined as official actors in establishing international commitments and both closely guard their constitutionally defined roles. yet most research concludes that Congress rarely matters when defining US commitments abroad. We explore the Senate's role in treaty-making during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) and the first term of George W. Bush (2001-2005). Our evidence confirms that even recent studies showing greater Senate influence on treaty-making significantly underestimate the upper chamber's role in defining US commitments abroad. Rather than killing treaties with a formal floor vote, the Senate exerts influence at the committee stage by refusing to act on controversial agreements negotiated by presidential administrations. President Bush has responded to such congressional oversight by establishing more international commitments through executive agreements rather than treaties, particularly when it comes to issues of security.
引用
收藏
页码:191 / 208
页数:18
相关论文
共 44 条