Wittgenstein's deflationary account of reference

Traditional accounts hold that reference consists in a relation between the mind and an object: the relation is effected by a mental act and mediated by internal mental contents (internal representations). Contemporary theories as diverse as Fodor's [Fodor, J.A., 1987. Psychosemmantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] language of thought hypothesis, Dretske's [Dretske, F., 1988. Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] informational semantics and Millikan's [Millikan, R.G., 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] teleosemantics share this act-content-object picture (which was also held by several early modern philosophers, in particular Locke). The core of the traditional view is the thesis that reference and intentionality are relational ('thesis RR'). Although deeply problematic, RR is entrenched also in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence. Using for the most part arguments employed by Wittgenstein, we mount a case against RR and advance a deflationary account of reference and intentionality according to which neither is relational. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.