Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.
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Univ Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro, Dipartimento Giurisprudenza & Sci Polit Econ & So, Via Cavour 84, I-15121 Alessandria, ItalyUniv Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro, Dipartimento Giurisprudenza & Sci Polit Econ & So, Via Cavour 84, I-15121 Alessandria, Italy
Faralla, Valeria
Novarese, Marco
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Univ Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro, Dipartimento Giurisprudenza & Sci Polit Econ & So, Via Cavour 84, I-15121 Alessandria, ItalyUniv Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro, Dipartimento Giurisprudenza & Sci Polit Econ & So, Via Cavour 84, I-15121 Alessandria, Italy
Novarese, Marco
Ardizzone, Antonella
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Univ IULM, Dipartimento Econ Studi Giuridici & Aziendali, Via Carlo Bo 8, I-20143 Milan, ItalyUniv Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro, Dipartimento Giurisprudenza & Sci Polit Econ & So, Via Cavour 84, I-15121 Alessandria, Italy