Economising, Strategising and the Vertical Boundaries of the firm

被引:0
|
作者
Leahy, Dermot [4 ]
Montagna, Catia [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Aberdeen, Dept Econ, Sch Business, Edward Wright Bldg,Dunbar St, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, Scotland
[2] Univ Edinburgh, Scottish Inst Res Econ, Room G5,30 Buccleuch Pl, Edinburgh EH8 9JT, Midlothian, Scotland
[3] Univ Nottingham, Globalisat & Econ Policy Ctr, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[4] Natl Univ Ireland Maynooth, Dept Econ, Maynooth, Kildare, Ireland
来源
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 17卷 / 01期
关键词
oligopoly; outsourcing; vertical integration; trade liberalisation; RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; INTERNATIONAL-ORGANIZATION; TRADE LIBERALIZATION; INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; GLOBAL ECONOMY; INTEGRATION; KEIRETSU; CONTEXT;
D O I
10.1515/bejte-2015-0085
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We bridge the organisational economics and industrial economics literatures on the vertical boundaries of the firm by contextualising the transaction cost approach to the make-or-buy decision within an oligopolistic market structure. Firms invest in the quality of the intermediate resulting in the endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate and marginal production cost of the final good. We highlight new strategic incentives to outsource and/or vertically integrate and show how these incentives can result in asymmetric-mode-of-operations, investment and costs. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.
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页数:35
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